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ABSTRACT 
In 2015, a rural Indiana county experienced an outbreak of HIV related to intravenous drug use. 
181 people were diagnosed with HIV between Oct. 1, 2014 and Nov. 1, 2015. This outbreak 
prompted the state legislature to implement a policy that legalized syringe exchange programs for 
the first time ever in Indiana. This capstone attempts to summarize the situation that led to the 
creation of this policy and the effects of this policy, Indiana Senate Enrolled Act 461 (IN SEA 
461). Finally, this capstone makes recommendations for modifying the existing policy or 
implementing a similar policy in an area experiencing a public health threat like the one in Indiana. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In early 2015, Scott County, Indiana made national news because of an outbreak of HIV among 
people who inject drugs.i Officials identified eleven new HIV cases in a few months in a county 
that typically sees fewer than five new HIV diagnoses in a year.i By March 2015, Indiana’s 
governor had declared a public health emergency through state executive order and authorized 
the state’s first-ever syringe exchange program in Scott Countyi and the state legislature passed a 
policy allowing for syringe exchange programs in counties experiencing similar public health 
emergencies shortly after.ii  
 Indiana’s policy, Indiana Senate Enrolled Act 461 (IN SEA 461), allows for syringe 
exchanges to operate in counties where a public health emergency has been declared.iii The only 
qualifying public health emergencies in the policy are outbreaks of Hepatitis C or HIV that are 
spread primarily through intravenous drug use (IDU).iii The policy requires that after a local 
health department has declared an outbreak of HIV or Hepatitis C and the local authority (e.g., 
county or local board of health) has agreed to operate a planned syringe exchange program, the 
public health emergency must be approved by the state health commissioner.iii This constitutes 
an approval of the syringe exchange program, which are authorized only in counties with 
declared public health emergencies.iii IN SEA 461 also requires annual renewal of the syringe 
exchange programs with the state health commissioner, limits a syringe exchange program’s 
operation to the county for which it is approved, requires a period of a public hearing before 
local authorities vote to authorize a syringe exchange program, requires data collection and 
reporting, and requires training on overdose response and safe syringe disposal practices.iii It 
prohibits using state funds to purchase syringes and needles and prohibits law enforcement 
officers from using participation in a syringe exchange program as probable cause.iii 
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Syringe exchange programs (SEPs) have been used since the 1980s to reduce the 
transmission of HIV and other blood-borne infections related to IDU.iv SEPs have historically 
been challenging to implement because of conflicting political goals: discouraging drug use and 
minimizing the spread of infectious disease caused by IV drug use, or harm reduction.iv Drug 
policies of the last 30 years including paraphernalia laws are designed to penalize and discourage 
drug use.v In contrast, harm reduction policies are, according to a 1996 paper by Marlatt, 
“designed to reduce the harmful consequences of addictive behavior for both drug consumers 
and for the society in which they live.”iv  
SEPs conflict with federal and some state paraphernalia laws, which make it illegal to 
possess certain objects with the intent to use them to use drugs, including needles and syringes.vi 
SEPs have historically been legally supported by either state policies that exempt 
needles/syringes from paraphernalia laws in certain circumstances or by public health emergency 
laws, which give state or local public health officials broad authority to “take necessary action to 
prevent the spread of disease.”vi A 1996 legal analysis of SEPs by Burris et al. described the laws 
that support SEPs and the pros and cons of operating with and without explicit state permission.vi 
Burris et al. noted that state policies authorizing SEPs—as Indiana’s policy does—not only 
authorize SEPs but also “[constitute] an endorsement of the intervention.”vi  
 My objectives for this capstone were, first, to examine the public health emergency in 
Scott County and the policy designed to respond to that emergency. This information will 
provide context for my second objective, which was to assess the differences in Indiana’s HIV 
and Hepatitis C diagnoses in counties operating SEPs versus counties not operating SEPs. My 
final objective is to summarize the effects of Indiana’s SEP policy and make recommendations 
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for public health officials or legislators considering how to modify the existing policy or how to 
respond to a public health crisis like that in Scott County.  
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METHODS 
Policy analysis 
 I analyzed the implementation of SEP policies in Indiana using Eugene Bardach’s 
eightfold policy analysis framework. The steps of the eightfold policy analysis framework are: 
define the problem, assemble some evidence, construct the alternatives, select the criteria, project 
the outcomes, confront the trade-offs, decide, and tell your story.vii Defining the problem requires 
framing the issue (what is working or not working) and creating “a definition of a problem that is 
analytically manageable and that makes sense in light of the political and institutional means 
available for mitigating it.”vii I did this by conducting a literature review on the risk of spreading 
Hepatitis C and HIV through IV drug use and describing the public health emergency in Scott 
County. To accomplish step 2, assemble some evidence, I researched SEP efficacy in reducing 
HIV and Hepatitis C transmission and characteristics of SEPs. For step 3, construct the 
alternatives, I considered alternative approaches to Indiana’s SEP policy informed by other 
systems. To accomplish step 4, select the criteria, I evaluated the political factors at work in 
policy adoption alongside the imperative to respond to the HIV outbreak in Scott County. To 
accomplish step 5, project the outcomes, I performed some means testing analyses to 
demonstrate differences between the mean new HIV and acute Hepatitis C diagnosis rates in 
counties operating SEPs and counties not operating SEPs from 2015 to 2017. For step 6, 
confront the trade-offs, I described the actual implementation of SEPs in Indiana from 2015 to 
2017. For step 7, decide, I recommended modifications to Indiana’s SEP policy and options for 
other states considering responses to a similar public health emergency. For step 8, tell your 
story, I summarized my findings on the unique characteristics of Indiana’s SEP and 
recommendations for policymakers and public health stakeholders.  
Literature review 
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 To accomplish several steps of the policy analysis, I conducted an extensive literature 
review. I searched the National Library of Medicine online database as well as Google Scholar 
for peer-reviewed articles from the last 30 years describing the history of SEPs, SEP policies, 
and the SEP effectiveness in preventing the spread of HIV/HCV. I conducted searches using 
terms including “syringe exchange programs”; “syringe exchange program effectiveness”; 
“syringe exchange program HIV”; “syringe exchange program Hepatitis C”; “syringe exchange 
program history”; “Scott County HIV”; and “Indiana syringe exchange program.” To confirm 
the operation of Indiana SEPs, I used the ISDH websiteviii as a starting point to find a list of 
counties operating SEPs as of March 2019. I created a timeline of SEP openings and closings 
within the study period (2015-2017) by searching Google for news articles. 
Quantitative analysis 
 I performed quantitative analysis using SPSS with publicly available data from the 
Indiana State Department of Health (IDSH). The data include the number of new HIV diagnoses 
from 2012 to 2017 by county and at the state level. The data also include acute Hepatitis C 
diagnoses by county and at the state level from 2012-2017 as well as the rate of fatal overdoses 
from any opioid from 2012 to 2017. 
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RESULTS 
Step 1: Define the Problem 
Public Health Risks of IV Drug Use 
 The HIV outbreak in Scott County, Indiana was mostly tied to IDU—of the 181 people 
newly diagnosed with HIV by November 1, 2015, 173 (95.6 percent) reported injecting any 
drugs at all.i 167 of these patients (92.3 percent) were also infected with Hepatitis C (HCV).i A 
team of researchers from the Indiana State Health Department defined an outbreak-related case 
as any laboratory-confirmed HIV diagnosis after October 1, 2014 for a person either residing in 
Scott County or who was identified as a syringe-sharing or sexual partner by another case 
patient.i The researchers described the average case-patient as 34 years old, male (57.5 percent, 
104/181), white (98.9 percent, 179/181), and residing in Scott County (89.5 percent, 162/181).i 
Affected Population 
 Scott County ranks 91 out of 92 Indiana counties in health outcomes (with 1/92 being 
best health outcomes and 92/92 being worst health outcomes) according to County Health 
Rankings from the University of Wisconsin’s Population Health Institute.ix It ranks in the bottom 
15 counties in almost all health factors and health outcomes assessed by County Health Rankings 
except physical environment factors (e.g., air pollution).ix The United States Census Bureau 
2013-2017 American Community Survey 5-year estimates indicate that 13.7 percent of Scott 
County residents live in poverty and the unemployment rate is 5.6 percent.x In Indiana, 14.7 
percent of residents live in poverty, and the unemployment rate is 9.4 percent.x 
Risk of Similar Outbreaks 
 The HIV outbreak in Scott County fits into a larger trend in bloodborne infections like 
HIV and HCV related to IDU in rural parts of the country. Researchers from the Centers for 
Disease Control (CDC) have found in separate studies that the incidence of HCV is increasing 
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nationwide, especially in rural areas.xi,xii One study by Suryaprasad et al. examined acute HCV 
infection data reported to the CDC and found that the incidence of HCV increased nationwide 
from 2006 to 2012, with a 13 percent annual increase over the study period in non-urban 
counties versus a 5 percent yearly increase in urban counties.xi 30 of 34 states reporting acute 
HCV data in both 2006 and 2012 reported higher incidence of acute HCV in young people 
(defined as people under 30) in 2012 than in 2006.xi The researchers also mapped the available 
county-level data and found that of 102 counties that reported an HCV incidence of more than 10 
per 100,000 people in 2012, 89 percent of these counties were east of the Mississippi River and 
many were located in the Appalachian region.xi  
Zibbell et al., another team of CDC researchers, analyzed data from Kentucky, West 
Virginia, Virginia, and Tennessee to assess the link between IDU and HCV infection, finding a 
364 percent increase in acute HCV infections in these four states from 2006 to 2012.xii IDU was 
reported in 73 percent of cases with available risk factor information.xii Both teams of researchers 
make recommendations to address the increase in acute HCV infections noting that IDU is also a 
risk factor for HIV infection.xiii Recommended interventions include improved HCV 
surveillance, syringe exchange programs, behavioral health services, and opioid substitution 
therapy.xi 
Step 2: Assemble Some Evidence 
Variation in SEP Structures 
 SEPs have been used as a strategy to reduce infections among people who inject drugs 
since the 1980s when the first SEPs opened in the Netherlands.iv SEP structures vary 
significantly. For example, some programs require SEP participants to register in a database, 
while others do not; some SEPs offer a 1-to-1 syringe exchange in which a participant receives 
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one sterile syringe/needle in exchange for one used syringe/needle, while others offer as many 
syringes as a participant would like up to a limit. SEPs also provide a place to link PWID with 
relevant services, including opioid substitution therapy and other treatment programs, social 
services, and clinical care. SEPs can be in any number of physical settings, sometimes clinical 
but not always. The variation in program structure makes it difficult to empirically assess the 
effectiveness of SEPs overall in reducing HIV/HCV infections among PWID. Most of the 
literature pertains to the efficacy of individual SEP structures in accomplishing a given program 
objective.  
 A 2010 systematic review by Jones et al. attempted to determine which types of SEPs are 
effective by drawing on studies of SEPs in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, France, 
and Australia and found that there was not enough evidence to determine effectiveness because 
of the variation in program settings and structures.xiv The researchers recommended further 
research on specific program settings, structures, and services to empirically determine 
effectiveness in achieving different outcomes (e.g., reduced HIV/HCV transmission, participants 
receiving behavioral/clinical health services, reduced syringe sharing).xiv  
Effectiveness of SEPs in Reducing HIV/HCV Transmission 
 Another systematic review by Abdul-Quader et al. attempted to identify commonalities in 
SEPs that are effective in reducing HIV/HCV infection.xv The researchers note that IDU is one of 
the most effective modes of HIV and HCV transmission.xv SEPs make sterile syringes more 
readily available for PWID, ideally resulting in fewer instances of syringe sharing—therefore, 
one measure of SEP effectiveness in preventing HIV/HCV transmission is reduced syringe 
sharing behavior.xv The researchers identified studies that reported reduced syringe sharing 
behavior in Switzerland, New Zealand, and the United States (specifically, Connecticut).xv Their 
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findings indicate that “significant public health benefits” can be seen when at least 50 percent of 
the population of PWID receives at least ten sterile syringes per year.xv The authors conclude that 
accessible and large-scale SEPs are important for HIV prevention, especially at the beginning of 
an epidemic of IDU-related disease.xv 
 Programmatic differences also prevented Platt et al. from drawing substantive 
conclusions in a 2017 systematic review and meta-analysis examining the effects of SEPs and 
opioid substitution therapy (OST) on the incidence of HCV.xvi The researchers found that the 
evidence of the effects of SEPs (as a standalone service or in combination with OST programs) 
on the incidence of HCV is inconclusive.xvi The researchers suggest that further research should 
account for variation in program structures, specifically, “the degree to which the [SEP] meets 
individuals’ requirement for needles and syringes.”xvi 
Urban versus Non-Urban SEPs 
 Research has also suggested differences in urban and non-urban SEPs. In a 2018 
systematic analysis, Paquette and Pollini attempted to describe the role of IDU in HIV/HCV 
transmission in non-urban areas of the US, characterize what is known about the available 
services related to HIV/HCV for PWID in non-urban areas, and identify areas to fill gaps in 
knowledge on HIV/HCV transmission, IDU, and HIV/HCV services in non-urban areas.xvii The 
researchers noted the role of cultural differences between IDU in urban and non-urban areas, as 
HIV/HCV are products of “risk environments.”xvii For example, urban and non-urban areas may 
differ in the types of drugs that are available or preferred, the types of services available for 
PWID and the ease of accessibility (e.g., availability of public transit), and social norms.xvii The 
researchers found that there are the small number of studies examining IDU in nonurban 
populations between 1990 and 2016 (n=34).xvii A 2015 study by Des Jarlais et al. cited in the 
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Paquette and Pollini study found that only 20 percent of SEPs nationwide are located in rural 
areas, while 9 percent are located in suburban areas,xvii,xviii and that non-urban SEPs generally 
have fewer participants and fewer resources than their urban peers, creating access problems and 
forcing PWID to rely on other sources to obtain sterile needles (e.g., pharmacy sales where 
available, other PWID).xvii,xviii In the context of the other literature that shows the rise of HCV in 
non-urban areas and the risk of HIV outbreaks, as in Scott County,xii,xvii this systematic review 
demonstrates a pressing need for more research on non-urban SEPs to understand and address 
structural differences between urban and non-urban SEPs. More research could inform policies 
that better address public health threats to non-urban PWID.xvii 
Effect of Funding on SEPs 
 One variable that has been found to influence the effectiveness of SEPs is funding. A 
2015 paper by Bramson et al. examined the link between public funding for SEPs on HIV 
incidence.xix In performing a systematic review, the researchers found that public funding for 
SEPs was associated with low rates of new HIV diagnoses or lower-than-expected rates of new 
HIV diagnoses.xix Conversely, they found that lack of public funding for SEPs was associated 
with high rates of new HIV diagnoses or raising the expected rates of new HIV diagnoses.xix 
Public funding of SEPs was also positively correlated with numbers of syringes distributed 
(public funding resulted in more syringes distributed, R2=0.52), as well as with provision of 
other health services to PWID including HIV counseling and testing, HCV testing, condom 
distribution, and overdose prevention services.xix  
Public funding of SEPs was banned in the United States from 1988 to 2015 except for a 
brief period from 2009 to 2011, and a 2015 partial reversal of the ban allows using federal funds 
for SEP operation but not supplies.xx According to a 2018 policy analysis by Showalter, the 
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federal funding ban was put into place in the 1980s, and the political debate over its 
implementation relied on “morality politics,” or conflicting priorities among lawmakers rooted in 
moral/ethical beliefs.xx The funding ban endured as more evidence on the effectiveness of SEPs 
emerged from other countries.xx Bramson et al. noted in their analysis of SEP funding that the 
federal funding ban “served as both a political message in opposition to SEPs and as a limiting 
factor for the funding of SEPs in areas that support these programs.”xix  
Step 3: Approaches to SEPs and Alternatives to SEPs 
Harm Reduction Policies 
 As previously mentioned, SEPs are a harm reduction policy.iv Harm reduction policies 
are often framed as conflicting with anti-drug policies; however, both types of policies ultimately 
strive for abstinence from substance use.iv Harm reduction policies allow for a “step-down 
approach” where PWID can receive services that protect individual and societal health without 
fear of legal repercussions.iv Harm reduction advocates also promote easy access to services—
programs should be structured to seek out those who would benefit, meet them where they are, 
and reduce the stigma associated with needing harm reduction services.iv Therefore, advocates’ 
ideal harm reduction programs should be relatively easy to establish and access and operate with 
cooperation from police and other authorities attempting to enforce anti-drug policies—that is, 
people who need harm reduction services should not be targeted by law enforcement for 
violating drug laws. 
Extrajudicial Operation 
 Leaders of SEPs operating without explicit legal authorization have been arrested for 
violation of paraphernalia laws in various states.vi However, courts have historically sided with 
the operators of such exchanges under the authority granted to public health agencies by public 
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health emergency laws.vi These laws broadly give authority to public health agencies “to take 
necessary action to prevent the spread of disease.”vi Operating without legal permission under 
the assumption that public health emergency laws are sufficient is a potential alternative to 
seeking explicit legal permission through a local or state legislature.vi Such operations can be less 
effective because they cannot seek state funding and they could be forced to stop operating, 
temporarily or permanently, because of legal challenges.vi Some advantages of seeking legal 
permission for a SEP from a local/state legislature are that legal authorization may allow for 
more resources and also effectively endorses the SEP; however, legislative action is a lengthy 
process that might not allow a public health agency to respond to an ongoing crisis.vi Legislative 
approval also may come with requirements like distribution limits, location requirements, limits 
or requirements on the scope of services offered, and data collection/reporting requirementsvi that 
burden the operators of the SEP, especially if state funds are not approved for SEPs. 
 California allowed SEPs to operate under public health emergency laws until 2000 when 
its legislature passed AB 136 to explicitly authorize SEP operation in jurisdictions experiencing 
a public health emergency.xxi Similar to Indiana’s policy, this required a public health emergency 
declaration and local approval of SEP plans.xxi In the years following the approval of the SEP 
policy, the number of SEPs in the state increased from 24 to 35 from 2000 to 2002, the 
proportion of “unapproved” SEPs declined from 54 to 40 percent, more than 1 million additional 
syringes were exchanged per year, and budgets increased 50 percent.xxi However, none of the 
highest-need areas (defined as counties with the highest rates of IDU-related AIDS cases) started 
SEPs in the study period, which leads to questions about whether the confusion about the policy 
requirements or other factors contributed to a lack of action in these areas.xxi  
Other Services for PWID 
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 SEPs are not the only service available explicitly designed to reduce disease, injury, and 
deaths among PWID. One 2018 study by Pitt, Humphreys, and Brandeau estimated the 5- and 
10-year effects on life years (LYs), quality-adjusted life years (QALYs), and projected opioid 
deaths of the following policies/practices: operating SEPs; making Naloxone (an antidote to 
opioid overdose) more widely available; codifying limits on opioid prescription practices; 
rescheduling or reformulating opioid medications; monitoring prescription opioid dispensation; 
offering excess opioid disposal services; offering psychosocial treatment; and offering 
medication assisted therapy.xxii In the 5-year estimate, Naloxone availability avoided the most 
opioid-related deaths among the interventions studied compared to the status quo (not 
implementing any interventions), reducing projected opioid deaths by 4 percent (averting 10,200 
projected deaths).xxii Syringe exchange programs are estimated to independently avoid 2,700 
heroin/opioid deaths over five years compared to the status quo.xxii In the 10-year analysis, 
opioid deaths averted by Naloxone and SEPs grew proportionally according to the base 
projection in the 5-year estimate.xxii Policies affecting opioid supply, like prescription monitoring 
and limited prescribing practices, were shown to avert total opioid deaths in the 5-year analysis 
but, when examining the deaths attributed to prescription opioids versus heroin, increased heroin 
deaths as users of prescription opioids would likely turn to heroin, causing harm to this 
population.xxii The researchers concluded that policies that increase access to treatment for 
addiction or services that mitigate harms of opioid use (including SEPs) are “immediately and 
uniformly beneficial, with no negative impact on LYs, QALYs, or addiction deaths.”xxii 
Step 4: Select the Criteria 
Political factors 
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 While the initial HIV cases were identified in Scott County in February 2015,ii it took 
until March 26, 2015 for Governor Mike Pence to declare a public health emergency and legally 
permit the operation of a local, short-term (30-day) syringe exchange program.xxiii Gov. Pence 
publicly waivered on his support for a syringe exchange program in Scott County, and upon 
signing the executive order allowing the Scott County SEP to operate said, “I do not support 
needle exchange as an anti-drug policy, but this is a public health emergency.”xxiv 
 SEPs are often controversial because of the perceived conflict with existing drug and 
paraphernalia laws. The United States’ first SEPs started in Washington in 1988 and New York 
in 1992,xxiii and as of 2017, 18 states and the District of Columbia explicitly legalized SEPs in 
state policies while three additional states (including Indiana) legalized SEPs under certain 
circumstances.xxv It is important to understand policy dissemination to understand the spread of 
SEPs across the country. 
 A 2006 analysis by Volden examined the spread of the Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (CHIP) policies from state-to-state by pairing and comparing states on several variables 
hypothesized to be related to the likelihood of policy adoption.xxvi CHIP is a federal program that 
offers grants to incentivize states to set up health insurance programs for children in families 
with incomes between the Medicaid threshold and 200 percent of the federal poverty level, with 
the federal government covering 65 to 80 percent of costs.xxvi CHIP allows for variation in 
waiting periods, coverage levels, and family income thresholds, and Volden’s analysis examined 
these variables to describe the dissemination of policy across states.xxvi Volden’s analysis found 
that policies are more likely to be emulated in Republican-controlled states if the original state is 
also Republican controlled, and also found correlations with similar ideological leanings, per 
capita income, managed care structures, and budgetary constraints.xxvi Importantly, Volden also 
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found that evidence of policy success was important for spreading policies from state to state, 
especially for policies implemented by legislatures and not administrators.xxvi This suggests that 
in formulating its SEP policy, Indiana may have looked to states that were politically or 
demographically similar and/or states that had SEP policies that were successful in reducing 
rates of disease transmitted by IDU. 
Advocacy 
 Research on the dissemination of SEPs has identified factors that predict the presence of 
a SEP in a given community. In one study, Tempalski et al. hypothesized that various local 
political, socioeconomic, and community resource variables would affect the distribution of 
SEPs in selected metropolitan areas (MSAs) with data available from the Beth Israel National 
Survey of Syringe Exchange Programs.xxvii The results showed that the presence of an AIDS 
Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP) chapter, a higher percentage of men who have sex with 
men, and a higher percentage of residents with a college education were predictors of the 
presence of a SEP in a given MSA.xxvii This speaks to the importance of grassroots organizing in 
establishing SEPs, because the weak associations of variables related to SEP need seems to 
suggest that SEP policies are the result of activism rather than need for SEP policies.xxvii 
Social Construction of Target Populations 
 The people who benefit from the presence of SEPs are primarily PWID who benefit from 
having access to sterile syringes and other services provided by a SEP. The beneficiaries of a 
given policy are an important consideration according to Schneider and Ingram’s 1993 paper 
about the social construction of a target population.xxviii Social construction refers to the 
characteristics ascribed to certain groups, like veterans, the elderly, and people who use 
drugs.xxviii Schneider and Ingram created a matrix to use to examine the social construction of 
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different groups, their power and their expected benefits from public policy.xxviii Drug users 
would likely be classified as “deviants” in this matrix, which is a group that can expect to be 
burdened as a result of policies.xxviii That PWID are the primary beneficiaries of SEPs also 
partially explains the slow adoption of SEP policies across the country and the delay between 
identifying the HIV outbreak in Scott County and authorizing and implementing the local SEP. 
The policy “burden” for deviants is also evident in the federal funding ban. When the 
federal funding ban was implemented in 1988, the majority of PWID who were affected by 
HIV/AIDS were living in coastal, urban locationsxx—lawmakers not representing these districts 
could ignore IDU-related HIV/AIDS because it did not impact their constituents.xx By 2015, 
when the ban was partially lifted, outbreaks of HIV and HCV among PWID had occurred in non-
urban settings, motivating certain lawmakers to prioritize this public health issue affecting their 
constituencies.xx The Showalter analysis of the federal funding ban provides some key 
takeaways, one of which is that the history of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and the relatively recent 
shift in affected or at-risk populations informed policy changes over time, including lifting the 
federal funding ban and the dissemination of SEPs.xx As different populations were affected and 
the social construction of those populations changed, attitudes and policies changed.xx 
Step 5: Project the Outcomes 
 Indiana’s SEP policy requires that a declaration of a public health emergency concerning 
HCV or HIV outbreaks related to IV drug use be approved by the state health commissioner.ii 
This requirement appear to prohibit the implementation of SEPs in counties that have yet to 
experience a disease outbreak. This suggests that, when compared to counties without SEPs, 
counties with SEPs will have higher incidences of acute HCV and HIV until enough time has 
passed to allow the intervention to disseminate among affected populations. My hypothesis is 
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that counties operating SEPs at any point in 2015 to 2017 will have higher mean new HIV 
diagnosis rates per 100,000 people as well as higher mean rates of acute HCV per 100,000 
people than counties without SEPs.  
Mean county-level new HIV diagnosis rate, acute HCV rate 
 The range of new HIV diagnosis rates in all 92 Indiana counties from 2012-2017 is 0 per 
100,000 to 661.2 per 100,000, the latter of which is the 2015 new HIV diagnosis rate in Scott 
County at the peak of the outbreak (see Table 1). The mean new HIV diagnosis rate in counties 
operating a SEP (from here on, SEP counties) at any point from 2015-2017 is 42.71 per 100,000. 
The mean new HIV diagnoses per 100,000 grouped by SEP status and year are described in 
Table 2 and illustrated in Figure 1. The mean new HIV diagnosis rate in counties not operating a 
SEP (from here on, non-SEP counties) at any point from 2015-2017 is 1.466. These means are 
skewed by the inclusion of two outliers identified by SPSS, which are the rate of new HIV 
diagnoses in Scott County in 2015 and 2016 (661.2 and 88.4 per 100,000, respectively). 
Excluding the Scott County 2015 data point, the mean new HIV diagnosis rate of SEP counties 
from 2015 to 2017 is 10.158 new HIV diagnoses per 100,000. Removing the other outlier data 
point from Scott County in 2016, the mean rate is 5.811 new HIV diagnoses per 100,000 for SEP 
counties from 2012 to 2017 (see Table 1). 
Table 1 – Descriptives of County-level Indiana new HIV diagnoses rates per 100,000, 
2015-2017 
Range 0 661.2 
SEP county mean 42.71 
Non-SEP county mean 1.466 
SEP county mean excluding Scott Co. in 2015 10.158 
SEP county mean excluding Scott Co. in 2015 
and 2016 
5.811 
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Table 2 – Mean new HIV diagnoses per 100,000 grouped by SEP status and year 
Year SEP N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error Mean 
2015 Non SEP 88 1.608 4.0468 .4314 
SEP 4 167.650 329.0408 164.5204 
2016 Non SEP 85 1.298 3.6662 .3977 
SEP 7 15.186 32.4380 12.2604 
2017 Non SEP 83 1.488 3.9790 .4368 
SEP 9 8.589 10.1983 3.3994 
 
Figure 1 – Mean new HIV diagnoses per 100,000 grouped by SEP status and year 
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Independent samples t-tests show no significant differences between the mean new HIV 
diagnoses per 100,000 in 2015 and 2016 in counties operating SEPs and counties not operating 
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SEPs, assuming unequal variances (including the outlier data points from Scott County in 2015 
and 2016) (see Table 3). However, there is a significant difference in the means of SEP and non-
SEP counties in 2017 (p=0.000), a year in which there are no statistical outliers. This suggests 
that the differences in the mean new HIV diagnoses in 2017 are attributable to more than 
chance—further studies on characteristics of SEP counties and non-SEP counties could shed 
light on reasons for the mean differences. 
Table 3 – Independent samples t-test comparing mean county-level new HIV diagnoses 
rates per 100,000 in SEP counties versus non-SEP counties grouped by year (2015-2017) 
Year Test Sig. (2-tailed) Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error Diff. 
2015 Equal variances 
assumed 
.000 -166.042 30.7795 
2015 Equal variances not 
assumed 
.387 -166.042 164.5210 
2016 Equal variances 
assumed 
.000 -13.8881 3.5759 
2016 Equal variances not 
assumed 
.301 -13.8881 12.2668 
2017 Equal variances 
assumed 
.000 -7.1009 1.7074 
2017 Equal variances not 
assumed 
.071 -7.1009 3.4274 
 
The range of acute HCV diagnoses in all counties in Indiana from 2015 to 2017 is 0 per 
100,000 to 16.5 per 100,000 (see Table 3). The mean acute HCV rate for SEP counties at any 
point from 2015 to 2017 is 2.31 per 100,000, while the mean for non-SEP counties over the same 
time is 0.57 per 100,000. The mean acute HCV diagnoses rates grouped by year and SEP status 
are described in Table 4 and illustrated in Figure 2. An independent sample t-test shows that, 
when comparing the mean acute HCV rates of the non-SEP counties versus the SEP counties and 
assuming equal variances, the difference between the means is statistically significant in 2017 
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(p=0.000) but not 2016 or 2015 (see Table 5). This suggests that the difference in mean acute 
HCV diagnoses between SEP counties and non-SEP counties is attributable to more than chance, 
and further analyses should examine characteristics of these counties that explain the mean 
differences. 
Table 4 – Descriptives of County-level Indiana new HCV diagnoses rates per 100,000, 
2015-2017 
Range 0 16.5 
SEP county mean 2.31 
Non-SEP county mean 0.57 
 
Table 5 – Mean acute HCV diagnoses per 100,000 grouped by SEP status and year 
Year SEP N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error Mean 
2015 Non SEP 88 .382 1.4989 .1598 
SEP 4 1.550 3.1000 1.5500 
2016 Non SEP 85 .745 2.4508 .2658 
SEP 7 1.100 2.9103 1.1000 
2017 Non SEP 83 .592 1.8568 .2038 
SEP 9 3.589 4.6700 1.5567 
 
Figure 2 – Mean acute HCV diagnoses per 100,000 grouped by SEP status and year 
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Table 6 – Independent samples t-test comparing mean county-level new HCV diagnosis 
rates per 100,000 in SEP counties versus non-SEP counties grouped by year (2015, 2016, 
2017) 
Year Test Sig. (2-tailed) Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error Diff. 
2015 Equal variances 
assumed 
.151 -1.1682 .8071 
2015 Equal variances not 
assumed 
.507 -1.1682 1.5582 
2016 Equal variances 
assumed 
.717 -.3553 .9768 
2016 Equal variances not 
assumed 
.763 -.3553 1.1317 
2017 Equal variances 
assumed 
.000 -2.9973 .7910 
2017 Equal variances not 
assumed 
.091 -2.9973 1.5699 
 
 
It is important to present the acute HCV analysis with the caveat that HCV data might be 
reported inconsistently—for example, in Scott County in 2015 ISDH data reports 0 acute HCV 
cases. However, studies on the HIV outbreak from 2015 identify several patients with HCV 
(without specifying if cases are acute or chronic).i This casts doubts on the accuracy of the HCV 
data reported from the state that would be resolved with more information about Indiana’s state 
and local surveillance practices. Such information was not collected for this study. 
Step 6: Confront the Trade-Offs: Actual Implementation of SEPs in Indiana 
Implementation of SEPs in Indiana 
 Indiana’s SEP policy requires three levels of approval.ii Health departments must first 
determine that there is an outbreak of disease caused primarily by IDU in the county (with no 
clarification in the policy on what constitutes an outbreak), declare a public health emergency, 
and draft plans to implement a local SEP.ii Second, a local power like a board of health or county 
commissioners must vote to approve the declaration of a public health emergency and the 
syringe exchange plans.ii Finally, the plans and declaration are sent to the state health 
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commissioner for review and approval of the public health emergency, which constitutes an 
approval of the planned SEP.ii 
From 2015 to 2017, nine counties launched syringe exchange programs (see Table 
6),ii,xxix while 24 counties engaged in SEP planning activities from April 2015 to May 2016, 
according to a qualitative study done by Meyerson et al. on SEP implementation in Indiana.ii  
Table 7 – Indiana counties operating syringe exchange programs 2015-2017 
County Month/year 
opened 
Notes 
Scott April 2015xxx  
Madison Aug. 2015xxxi Defunded by local authorities in 2017xxxi 
Fayette Nov. 2015xxxii  
Monroe Feb. 2016xxxiii  
Wayne Aug. 2016xxxiv  
Lawrence Dec. 2016xxxv Closed by local authorities in 2017xxxvi 
Allen Nov. 2016xxxvii  
Clark Jan. 2017xxxviii  
Tippecanoe Aug. 2017xxxix  
 
Health officials interviewed about SEP implementation procedures for Meyerson et al.’s 
study spoke of concerns with Indiana’s policy. A common concern was confusion about the 
annual re-authorization process; lack of epidemiologic data at a local level to determine if a 
county is experiencing a public health emergency; lack of funding for both SEP services and lack 
of additional funding for local health services (like increased HIV testing to identify public 
health emergencies) at the time; and rejection of SEP plans involving resource-sharing including 
mobile distribution centers.ii These concerns will be discussed in steps 7 and 8. 
Step 7: Decide—Recommend modifications 
 Indiana’s SEP policy differs from neighboring states in that it requires a declaration of a 
public health emergency related to HIV or HCV infections. In Ohio and Kentucky, two 
comparison states selected for this analysis, decisions about implementing SEPs are made 
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entirely at the local level without requiring any such declaration or state-level approval.xl,xli This 
appears to be the most notable difference between Indiana and its neighbors—whereas HIV and 
HCV surveillance data can inform decisions about SEPs in other states, HIV and HCV 
surveillance data is required in Indiana to prove a need for a SEP. This adds a hurdle to 
establishing a SEP in Indiana in addition to gaining buy-in from local political leaders and 
community members and allocating resources to SEP operation. One local health authority 
quoted in Meyerson et al.’s qualitative study noted that communicable disease data is managed 
entirely by ISDH for some counties without the capacity to do their surveillance.ii This means 
that if, for example, ISDH acute HCV data is incomplete or not regularly updated, counties 
without the capacity to do local surveillance may not be able to prove a need for a SEP using 
state HCV data. Improved surveillance and consistent reporting practices could give Indiana’s 
local health authorities the tools to quickly assess the need for SEPs and implement programs, 
and this could be accomplished by allocating funding for HIV and HCV testing and reporting 
services in the SEP policy.  
 The SEP policy could also be amended to allow additional health measures that indicate 
the prevalence of drug use in a community, including hospital discharges for overdoses and 
overdose deaths, to serve as indicators of a public health emergency related to IDU. This would 
help local health authorities assess the need for SEPs without relying entirely on the state’s HCV 
or HIV data. In an analysis of ISDH data on overdose deaths from any opioid from 2012 to 2017 
alongside acute HCV rates and new HIV diagnosis rates from 2012 to 2017, overdose deaths 
were shown to positively and significantly correlate with the rate of acute HCV diagnoses 
(p=0.002, Pearson correlation coefficient=0.965, n=6) (see Table 7). While this is a small sample 
size, it demonstrates the possibility that data other than rates of HIV/HCV are available and 
 33 
suitable to predict the prevalence of drug use in a community and the subsequent risks of disease 
outbreaks. 
Table 8 – Correlations, county-level new HIV diagnosis rates, acute HCV rate, fatal 
overdoses of any opioid rate per 100,000, 2012-2017 
  New HIV 
diagnoses rate 
Acute HCV 
rate 
Fatal ODs of 
any opioid rate 
New HIV 
diagnoses rate 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .080 .223 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .880 .671 
N 6 6 6 
Acute HCV rate Pearson 
Correlation 
.080 1 .965 
Sig. (2-tailed) .880  .002 
N 6 6 6 
Fatal ODs of 
any opioid rate 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.223 .965 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .671 .002  
N 6 6 6 
 
This finding is also reflected in a 2016 study by Van Handel et al. that identified the 
following variables associated with county-level acute HCV rates nationwide: drug overdose 
deaths per 100,000, prescription opioid sales per 100,000, median per capita income, percent of 
white, non-Hispanic race/ethnicity, and unemployment among the population 16 years of age or 
older.xlii Future discussions of policy modification should consider allowing counties to use 
criteria other than HIV/HCV to declare a public health emergency, or eliminating the public 
health emergency criteria altogether. As is, “outbreak” and “public health emergency” are 
undefined and the only defined requirement is that the outbreak must be related to IDU. In the 
absence of timely and accurate data on new HIV and acute HCV diagnoses, health departments 
should be empowered to use their available resources and local knowledge to determine the 
prevalence of IDU in their communities, assess the risk to public health, and determine whether 
SEPs are an appropriate response. Allowing additional reporting data may also allow county 
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hospitals to get involved in the SEP planning process. County hospitals would be able to report 
relevant measures to their local health departments, allowing local health departments to benefit 
from the surveillance and reporting capabilities of their county’s hospitals. 
The other notable difference in Indiana’s policy is the annual renewal requirement. 
Policies in Ohio and Kentucky do not require renewal—decisions to start and end programs are 
made by local authorities. The annual renewal requirement confused some local health 
authorities included in Meyerson et al.’s qualitative study of SEPs in Indiana, with some pointing 
out that if SEPs effectively reduced new HIV or HCV diagnoses, then counties would seem to no 
longer meet the public health emergency criteria.ii Local health authorities also pointed out that 
the annual renewal requirement imposes burdens on their local health departments’ resources, 
requiring significant time spent on the renewal process that should ideally be spent fulfilling 
other health department functions.ii Modifying the policy to allow approvals to be valid until 
local or state health authorities decide otherwise would relieve health departments, especially 
smaller health departments, of the burden of devoting resources to the annual renewal process. If 
it results in continued SEP operation, removing the annual renewal requirement might also allow 
accurate assessment of SEP effects over time with fewer potential interruptions in SEP services. 
Indiana’s policy imposes a jurisdictional limit on SEPs, limiting the operation a SEP to 
the county for which it is approved, meaning that counties are not allowed to share resources in 
the form of mobile or traveling SEPs. Meyerson et al. identified at least one incidence of a multi-
county SEP being rejected because of the jurisdictional limitations.ii This presents logistical 
challenges for health departments with fewer resources and forces counties to rely primarily on 
their assessment, assurance, and policy development capabilities, which is significant because 
local health departments are county health departments in Indiana.xliii This means that each of the 
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92 counties has its own health department with different resources and therefore different 
capabilities to effectively fulfill each of the three core functions of public health. Local health 
departments lacking the assessment or policy development capabilities to determine the need for 
a SEP and create plans for implementation are effectively prohibited from using SEPs as an 
intervention, as any resource-sharing agreements that may support other health department 
activities appear to be prohibited for SEPs. 
Indiana’s SEP policy was modified in the 2017 legislative session to provide an option 
for counties to approve their public health emergency declarations locally.xliv This removes an 
additional barrier by eliminating the requirement to seek state approval—however, it still 
provides the option to seek state approval and maintains the requirement to establish a public 
health emergency based on HIV and/or HCV diagnoses.xliv The modified policy also extends the 
renewal period to every two years, instead of one year, and extends the policy expiration to July 
1, 2021.xliv 
Table 8 shows some selected SEP characteristics identified in steps 1 through 6 of the 
policy analysis and describes how Indiana’s SEP policy does or does not meet these 
characteristics. Any of these characteristics could be areas for further review and modification in 
discussions about revising Indiana’s SEP policy or implementing a similar policy. 
Table 9 – Selected SEP characteristics compared to Indiana’s SEP policy 
Policy characteristic Does 
Indiana’s 
policy 
provide 
this? 
Description SEA 461 
Sectioniii 
Data collection Yes Mandates information collection and 
reporting on individuals served (without 
personally identifiable information), 
syringes received and distributed 
IC 16-41-
7.5-10 
Public funding No Explicitly bans state funds for purchasing 
syringes and needles 
IC 16-41-
7.5-8 
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Lack of interference 
from law enforcement 
Yes Specifies that SEP participation is not 
grounds for probable cause 
IC 16-41-
7.5-9 (a) 
(b) 
Legal authorization Yes Legally permits operation when 
requirements are met 
IC 16-41-
7.5-5 
Increase access to 
other services that 
mitigate harms of 
IDU 
Yes Requires dispensation of Naloxone, 
provision of information about treatment 
and referrals for services 
IC 16-41-
7.5-6 (3) 
(9) 
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DISCUSSION and CONCLUSION 
Step 8: Tell Your Story—Discussion  
 The HIV outbreak in Scott County was effectively contained within 2 years of the 
implementation of a local SEP—Scott County’s rate of new HIV diagnoses per 100,000 was a 
statistical outlier in the 2015 and 2016 but not 2017. The influx of local, state, and federal 
resources dedicated to identifying and treating new HIV cases and preventing further HIV cases 
certainly impacted this finding as well, though I was unable to control for these variables in this 
analysis. IN SEA 461 appears to have helped adequately address the public health crisis that led 
to its creation in Scott County. In all Indiana counties operating SEPs, the analyses in section 5 
seem to indicate that there are meaningful differences in the mean HIV and HCV rates starting in 
2017. 
There are three requirements in Indiana’s SEP policy that differentiate it from other 
similar policies and may potentially affect the public health benefits of SEPs. First, Indiana’s 
SEP policy imposes multiple levels of permission on local health departments seeking to 
establish SEPs. Second, the policy mandates periodic renewal. Third, the policy effectively 
prohibits multi-jurisdictional SEPs by specifying that SEPs can only operate in the jurisdiction 
seeking approval. 
Health departments with the political and resource capital to implement a SEP may not be 
able to meet the public health emergency requirement if they cannot prove that they have an 
HIV/HCV outbreak related to IDU. The public health emergency requirement appears to force 
counties with a known population of people with HIV or HCV acquired through other modes of 
transmission to wait and see if HIV or HCV spreads to a population of PWID—it does not 
appear to allow SEPs as a preventive measure before an outbreak. Consider the example of 
Marion County, which consists almost entirely of the city of Indianapolis and received approval 
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for its SEP in summer 2018.xlv News articles from prior to the implementation indicate that the 
need for continued and comprehensive surveillance was at least partly responsible for the delay 
in developing SEP plans for Marion County.xlvi 
 Literature shows that SEPs are effective at reducing syringe-sharing behavior and, at a 
certain saturation point, can provide significant public health benefits.xv Implementing a SEP and 
reaching the saturation point at which SEPs are effective may be more challenging for health 
departments with few resources in the form of community assets like harm reduction coalitions 
or health care providers willing to support SEPs, staff members to fulfill the assessment and 
policy development functions required to get approval or re-approval of a SEP, or funds to cover 
supplies or operational costs. Prohibiting multi-jurisdictional SEPs further disadvantages 
communities lacking the above-mentioned resources, creating barriers to SEP implementation 
and success in those communities. 
 Another characteristic of Indiana’s SEP policy is that it prohibits SEPs from using state 
funds to purchase needles and syringes. Previously cited research show that publicly funded 
SEPs perform better relative to their non-publicly funded peers.xix However, funding bans are not 
uncommon and a federal funding ban was maintained until 2015, and even today federal funds 
cannot be used for needles and syringes.xx If Indiana wanted to explore options to improve public 
health outcomes through SEPs, reconsidering the state funding ban may be a point of discussion 
for future policy modifications. 
Allowing local health departments to assess their local needs and capabilities to provide 
SEPs using criteria other than HIV/HCV cases, sharing resources across multiple jurisdictions 
when needed, and removing the renewal requirement could improve results from Indiana’s 
program and bring it in line with policies in neighboring states experiencing similar public health 
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threats. Allowing state funding to support any SEP needs including needles and syringes would 
differentiate Indiana’s policy from its neighboring states, but could positively impact its 
outcomes by mitigating the financial barriers to operating SEPs. 
This study also identifies areas for further research to clarify the effects of SEPs and 
characteristics of local communities and health departments that lead to successful SEPs. Further 
areas of research identified in this study include the association between health department 
budgets and/or staffing levels and the likelihood SEP implementation, the association between 
presence of a local advocacy group and SEP implementation, and a description of resource-
sharing agreements to deliver other public health services in Indiana and the existing frameworks 
that could support resource-sharing SEPs if the policy were to be modified to allow them. 
Limitations 
 There are several limitations to this study. First, ISDH data for HCV seems to be 
inaccurate. This is potentially due to surveillance issues at the local and state level. 
 I was also unable to account for other variables related to the spread of HIV and acute 
HCV, and these analyses did not consider race, age, gender, or mode of transmission. There are 
also likely other policies and programs available to address IDU and help control the spread of 
HIV/HCV caused by IDU. An accurate analysis of this policy’s effects would have to account 
for services linking people with HIV/HCV testing and treatment, HIV/HCV prevention efforts, 
and other services designed to control the spread of these particular infections. The presence of 
such services would likely affect the rates of new HIV diagnoses and acute HCV cases. 
 Finally, Indiana’s SEP policy is relatively new—as of publication, IN SEA 461 was 
implemented four years ago and the modified policy was implemented two years ago. It is 
difficult to assess the outcomes of this policy with so few years of data to analyze. Allowing the 
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policy to continue should allow future researchers to more clearly identify trends and describe 
the effects of Indiana’s SEP policy. 
Conclusion 
 Indiana’s SEP policy was formulated as a response to an outbreak of HIV related to IDU 
in a rural county. SEPs were illegal in Indiana until 2015, and adoption of SEPs has been slow, 
with 9/92 counties reporting operating a SEP at any point in the first three years of the program. 
The HIV outbreak in Scott County was contained in 2017, the first year in which Scott County’s 
HIV infection rate was not a statistical outlier, though it was not possible in this assessment to 
determine if this is because of the local SEP alone or in combination with other public health 
services (e.g., HIV testing, treatment). In some ways, Indiana’s SEP policy does not align with 
policy characteristics associated with successful SEPs identified in the literature. In other ways, 
Indiana’s policy includes characteristics that could lead to improved public health outcomes, like 
SEP data collection and reporting and overdose treatment. The policy was already modified once 
in the 2017 legislative session. This analysis provides context for analyzing the effects of the 
policy to date and suggestions for future discussions about modifying Indiana’s policy or 
creating policies in areas experiencing a public health emergency similar to the one in Scott 
County. 
  
 41 
 
REFERENCES 
i Peters, P., Pontones, P., Hoover, K., Patel, M., Galang, R., Shields, J., Blosser, S., Spiller, M., Combs, B., Switzer, W., 
Conrad, C., Gentry, J., Khudyakov, Y., Waterhouse, D., Owen, M., Chapman, E., Roseberry, J., McCants, V., Weidle, 
P., Broz, D., Samandari, T., Mermin, J., Walthall, J., Brooks, J., and Duwve, J. (2016). HIV Infection Linked to 
Injection Use of Oxymorphone in Indiana, 2014-2015. New England Journal of Medicine, 375(3), 229-39. DOI: 
10.1056/NEJMoa1515195 
ii Meyerson, B., Lawrence, C., Miller, L., Gillespie, A., Raymond, D., Kelley, K., and Shannon, D.J. (2017). Against the 
Odds: Syringe Exchange Policy Implementation in Indiana. AIDS Behavior, 21, 973-81. DOI: 10.1007/s10461-017-
1688-7 
iii SEA 461. (2015, June 25). Retrieved March 29, 2019, from http://iga.in.gov/static-
documents/d/1/a/6/d1a62251/SB0461.04.ENRS.pdf 
iv Marlatt, G. (1996). Harm Reduction: Come As You Are. Addictive Behaviors, 21(6), 779-788. DOI: 10.1016/0306-
4603(96)00042-1 
v Bramson, H., Des Jarlais, D., Arasteh, K., Nugent, A., Guardino, V., Feelemyer, J., and Hodel, D. (2015). State laws, 
syringe exchange, and HIV among persons who inject drugs in the United States: History and effectiveness. Journal 
of Public Health Policy, 36(2), 212-230. DOI: 10.1057/jphp.2014.54 
vi Burris, S., Finucane, D., Gallagher, H., and Grace, J. (1996). The Legal Strategies Used in Operating Syringe 
Exchange Programs in the United States. American Journal of Public Health, 86(8), 1161-1166. Retrieved from 
http://ezproxy.uky.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-
com.ezproxy.uky.edu/docview/78217242?accountid=11836 
vii Bardach, E. (2005). A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective Problem Solving. 
Washington, DC: CQ Press. 
viii ISDH ERC Stats Explorer. (n.d.). Retrieved March 29, 2019, from 
https://gis.in.gov/apps/isdh/meta/stats_layers.htm 
ix Scott County, Indiana. (n.d.). Retrieved March 26, 2019, from http://www.countyhealthrankings.org/app/ 
indiana/2019/rankings/scott/county/outcomes/overall/snapshot 
x Data Access and Dissemination Systems (DADS). (2010, October 05). American FactFinder - Results. Retrieved 
March 26, 2019 from https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview. 
xhtml?pid=ACS_17_5YR_CP03&prodType=table 
xi Suryaprasad, A., White, J., Eichler, B., Hamilton, J., Patel, A., Bel Hamdounia, S., Church, D., Barton, K., Fisher, C., 
Macomber, K., Stanley, M., Guilfoyle, S., Sweet, K., Liu, S., Iqbal, K., Tohme, R., Sharapov, U., Kupronis, B., Ward, J., 
and Holmberg, S. (2014). Emerging Epidemic of Hepatitis C Virus Infections Among Young Nonurban Persons Who 
Inject Drugs in the United States, 2006-2012. Clinical Infectious Diseases, 59(10), 1411-1419. Doi: 
10.1093/cid/ciu643 
xii Zibbell, J., Iqbal, K., Patel, R., Suryaprasad, A., Sanders, K., Moore-Moravian, L., Serrecchia, J., Blankenship, S., 
Ward, J., and Holtzman D. (2015). Increases in Hepatitis C Virus Infection Related to Injection Drug Use Among 
Persons Aged ≤30 Years — Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia, 2006–2012. Morbidity and Mortality 
Weekly Report. 64(17), 453-458. 
xiii Conrad, C., Bradley, H., Broz, D., Buddha, S., Chapman, E., Galang, R, Hillman, D., Hon, J., Hoover, K., Patel, M., 
Perez, A., Peters, P., Pontones, P., Roseberry, J., Sandoval, M., Shields, J., Walthall, J., Waterhouse, D., Weidle, P., 
Wu, H., and Duwve, J. (2015). Community outbreak of HIV infection linked to injection drug use of oxymorphone—
Indiana, 2015. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. 64, 1-2. 
xiv Jones, L., Pickering, L., Sumnall, H., McVeigh, J., and Bellis, M. (2010). Optimal provision of needle and syringe 
exchange programmes for injecting drug users: a systematic review. International Journal of Drug Policy. 21, 335-
342. Doi:10.1016/j.drugpo.2010.02.001. 
xv Abdul-Quader, A., Feelemyer, J., Modi, S., Stein, E., Briceno, Al, Semaan, S., Horvath, T., Kennedy, G., and Des 
Jarlais, D. (2013). Effectiveness of Structural-Level Needle/Syringe Programs to Reduce HCV and HIV Infection 
Among People who Inject Drugs: A Systematic Review. AIDS Behav. 17, 2878-2892. Doi: 10.1007/s10461-013-0593-
y. 
                                                 
 42 
                                                                                                                                                             
xvi Platt, L., Minozzi, S., Reed, J., Vickerman, P., Hagan, H., French, C., Jordan, A., Degenhardt, L., Hope, V., 
Hutchinson, S., Maher, L., Palmateer, N., Taylor, A., Bruneau, J., and Hickman, M. (2017). Needle and syringe 
programmes and opioid substitution therapy for preventing HCV transmission among people who inject drugs: 
findings from a Cochrane Review and meta-analysis. Addiction. 113, 545-563. Doi:10.1111/add.14012. 
xvii Paquette, C. and Pollinij, R. (2018). Injection drug use, HIV/HCV, and related services in nonurban areas of the 
United States: A systematic review. Drug and Alcohol Dependence. 188, 239-250. Doi: 
10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2018.03.049. 
xviii Des Jarlais, D., Nugent, A., Solberg, A., Feelemyer, J., Mermin, J., and Holtzman, D. (2015). Syringe Service 
Programs for Persons Who Inject Drugs in Urban, Suburban, and Rural Areas — United States, 2013. Morbidity and 
Mortality Weekly Report. 64(48), 1337-1341. 
xix Bramson, H., Des Jarlais, D., Arasteh, K., Nugent, A., Guardino, V., Feelemyer, J., and Hodel, D. (2015). State laws, 
syringe exchange, and HIV among persons who inject drugs in the United States: History and effectiveness. Journal 
of Public Health Policy. 36(2), 212-230. Doi:10.1057/jphp.2014.54. 
xx Showalter, D. (2018). Federal funding for syringe exchange in the US: Explaining a long-term policy failure. 
International Journal of Drug Policy. 55, 95-104. Doi:10.1057/jphp.2014.54. 
xxi Bluthenthal, R., Heinzerling, K., Anderson, R., Flynn, N., and Kral, A. (2008). Approval of Syringe Exchange 
Programs in California: Results from a Local Approach to HIV Prevention. American Journal of Public Health. 98(2), 
278-283. Doi:10.2105/AJPH.2005.080770 
xxii Pitt, A., Humphreys, K., and Brandeau, M. (2018). Modeling Health Benefits and Harms of Public Policy 
Responses to the US Opioid Epidemic. American Journal of Public Health. 108(10), 1394-1400. 
Doi:10.2105/AJPH.2018.304590. 
xxiii Rich, J. and Adashi, E. (2015). Ideological Anachronism Involving Needle and Syringe Exchange Programs: 
Lessons From the Indiana HIV Outbreak. JAMA. 314(1), 23-24. Doi:10.1001/jama.2015.6303. 
xxiv Twohey, M. (2016, August 7). Mike Pence’s Response to H.I.V. Outbreak: Prayer, Then a Change of Heart. New 
York Times. Retrieved March 20, 2019, from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/08/us/politics/mike-pence-
needle-exchanges-indiana.html 
xxv Laws Related to Syringe Exchange | Policy and Programs | Division of Viral Hepatitis | CDC. (n.d.). Retrieved 
from https://www.cdc.gov/hepatitis/policy/SyringeExchange.htm 
xxvi Volden, C. (2006). States as Policy Laboratories: Emulating Success in the Children’s Health Insurance Program. 
American Journal of Political Science. 50(2), 294-312. Accessed from: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3694274 
xxvii Tempalski, B., Flom, P., Friedman, S., Des Jarlais, D., Friedman, J., McKnight, C., and Friedman, R. (2007). Social 
and Political Factors Predicting the Presence of Syringe Exchange Programs in 96 US Metropolitan Areas. American 
Journal of Public Health. 97(3), 437-447. Doi:10.2105/AJPH.2005.065961 
xxviii Schneider, A. and Ingram H. (1993). Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and 
Policy. The American Political Science Review. 87(2), 334-347. Accessed at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2939044 
xxix Jastrzebski, S. (2016, December 20). For Tippecanoe County, Needle Exchange Approval Was Easy Compared To 
Next Steps. WBAA, Retrieved 24 March 2019 from https://www.wbaa.org/post/tippecanoe-county-needle-
exchange-approval-was-easy-compared-next-steps#stream/0  
xxx Johnson, J. (2015, April 22). How the Scott County, Indiana Needle Exchange Works. WFPL, Retrieved from 
https://wfpl.org/scott-county-indiana-needle-exchange-program-works/ 
xxxi Bull, H. (2017 August 9). Madison County Defunds Needle Exchange Program. Fox59, Retrieved from 
https://fox59.com/2017/08/09/madison-county-defunds-needle-exchange-program/ 
xxxii Sprague, J. (2015 November 19). Needle exchange program opens in Fayette County. Indiana Economic Digest, 
Retrieved from https://indianaeconomicdigest.com/main.asp?SectionID=31&SubSectionID 
=91&ArticleID=81971&TM=61556.45 
xxxiii Bondus, B. (2016 February 14). Monroe County begins syringe exchange program. CBS4, Retrieved from 
https://cbs4indy.com/2016/02/14/monroe-county-debuts-syringe-exchange-program/ 
xxxiv Emery, M. (2016 July 11). Wayne County needle exchange to start in August. Richmond Palladium-Item, 
Retrieved from https://www.pal-item.com/story/news/local/2016/07/11/wayne-county-needle-exchange-start-
august/86847730/ 
xxxv N.A. (2016 December 12). Lawrence County’s Needle Exchange Opens Tuesday. WBIW, Retrieved from 
http://www.wbiw.com/local/archive/2016/12/lawrence-countys-needle-exchange-program-opens-tuesday.php 
 43 
                                                                                                                                                             
xxxvi Lopez, G. (2017 October 20). An Indiana county just halted a lifesaving needle exchange program, citing the 
Bible. Vox, Retrieved from https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/10/20/16507902/indiana-lawrence-
county-needle-exchange 
xxxvii Carroll, J. (2016 December 7). A look inside the Allen County needle exchange clinic. WANE, Retrieved from 
https://www.wane.com/news/local-news/health-department-announces-syringe-services-program-
hours/1000583572 
xxxviii Winer, M. (2017 January 25). Clark Co. needle exchange to open Tuesday. Louisville Courier-Journal, Retrieved 
from https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/local/indiana/2017/01/25/clark-county-needle-exchange-
opens-thursday/96737608/ 
xxxix Bangert, D. (2018 December 3). Controversial needle exchange will move to new neighborhood in Lafayette in 
2019. Lafayette Journal & Courier, Retrieved from https://www.jconline.com/story/news/2018/12/03/needle-
exchange-move-new-neighborhood-lafayette-2019/2190148002/ 
xl Guidelines for Local Health Departments Implementing Needle Exchange Programs. (n.d.). Retrieved March 29, 
2019, from https://chfs.ky.gov/agencies/dph/dehp/hab/Documents/HRSEPGuidLV.pdf 
xli Am. H.B. 92. (n.d.) Retrieved March 29, 2019 from 
http://archives.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText130/130_HB_92_PH_Y.pdf 
xlii Van Handel, M., Rose, C., Hallisey, El, Kolling, J., Zibbell, J., Lewis, B., Bohn, M., Jones, C. Flanagan, B., Siddiqi, A., 
Iqbal, K., Dent, A., Mermin, J., McCray, E., Ward, J., and Brooks, J. (2016). County-level Vulnerability Assessment for 
Rapid Dissemination of HIV or HCV Infections among Persons who Inject Drugs, United States. J Acquir Immune 
Defic Syndr. 73(3), 323-331. Doi: 10.1097/QAI.0000000000001098 
xliii Local Health Department Information. (n.d.). Retrieved March 29, 2019 from 
https://www.in.gov/isdh/24822.htm 
xliv Syringe Services & Harm Reduction Program Manual for Health Departments. (2017). Retrieved March 29, 2019 
from https://www.in.gov/isdh/files/Guidance%20Document%20-%202017%20Update%20-%209-12-17-EC.pdf 
xlv Sheridan, J. (2018 June 18). Syringe exchange approved for Marion County. Indiana Public Radio, Retrieved from 
https://indianapublicradio.org/news/2018/06/syringe-exchange-approved-for-marion-county/ 
xlvi Rudavsky, S. (2017 December 17). Why Marion County doesn’t have a needle exchange. The Indianapolis Star, 
Retrieved from https://www.indystar.com/story/news/2017/12/17/why-marion-county-doesnt-have-needle-
exchange/949707001/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 44 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 45 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
 
Katherine Youngen is a Master of Public Health student in the College of Public 
Health in the Health Management and Policy concentration. She holds a Bachelor 
of Arts in Public Relations and a Bachelor of Arts in French from Butler 
University in Indianapolis, Indiana. 
